In late October 1998, the remnants of Hurricane Mitch stalled over Honduras and Nicaragua, killing more than 10,000 people and causing as much as $8.5 billion in damage. While Central America and the Caribbean have a history of natural disasters, the fatalities and destruction caused by Mitch were the greatest in at least several decades, prompting many questions including: What accounts for the extent of these losses? Is Mitch a harbinger of future disasters in the region? and What might be done in response? This paper seeks to shed light on these questions by examining the historical and geographic context of hurricane vulnerability in Latin America and the Caribbean. The paper examines trends in economic and other societal factors that increase vulnerability to hurricanes in Central America and the Caribbean and includes a case study of normalized hurricane losses in Cuba made possible by newly collected damage data published herein. The paper places its findings into the context of policies related to climate change and natural hazards.
Mitch started out as a tropical wave and was upgraded to a Category 5 hurricane by October 26. The storm weakened by the time it made landfall on October 29 and was downgraded to a tropical storm by October 30. Although its winds decreased by landfall, Mitch produced heavy rains that approached a year's average rainfall in some areas ͑Ferraro et al. 1999; IFRCRCS 1999͒. These rains led to flash floods and landslides that killed thousands of people who inhabited exposed areas ͑Guiney and Lawrence 1999͒. While Mitch's impacts were greatest in Honduras and Nicaragua, it also affected El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize, and Costa Rica.
Central America and the Caribbean have a history of natural disasters, but the fatalities and destruction caused by Mitch were the greatest in at least several decades. The tremendous devastation and loss of life has prompted many questions, such as: What accounts for the extent of these losses? Is Mitch a harbinger of future disasters? and What might be done in response? This paper seeks to shed light on these questions by examining the historical and geographic context of hurricane vulnerability in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Several recent studies argue that understandings of societal impacts of hurricanes and other extreme events have at times been based on incorrect assumptions and misinterpreted data ͑e.g., Pielke and Landsea 1998; Kunkel et al. 1999; Pielke and Downton 2000͒ . Poor understandings are particularly significant when they form the basis for policy making in response to the growing impacts of weather and climate on society ͑Pielke and Pielke 1997; . A more accurate understanding of weather impacts necessarily acknowledges the actual and potential influences of both changes in climate and changes in society. In the United States, for example, economic impacts of hurricanes increased dramatically during a prolonged period of relatively benign hurricane activity ͑Pielke and Landsea 1998͒. The implication is that the single largest factor conditioning the growth in hurricane losses in the United States is rapidly increasing coastal population and wealth, not changes or variability in climate ͑Landsea et al. 1999͒.
The case of hurricanes in the United States, however, is not necessarily representative of tropical cyclone impacts in other regions or of the impacts of other phenomena such as floods. This paper examines trends in economic and other societal factors that increase vulnerability to hurricanes in Central America and the Caribbean, introducing a simple normalization methodology that can be used to estimate the losses that would be associated with historical hurricanes if they occurred under current societal conditions. The findings are then placed in the context of policies related to climate change and natural hazards.
Regional Climatology
Hurricane activity varies greatly throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. All portions of Latin America ͑including Central America and South America͒ south of 10°N latitude had a less than 1% chance of a hurricane strike per year. The annual likelihood of hurricane activity increased farther from the equator to a maximum of Ͼ20% northeast of the Bahamas. While the coastal region with the greatest hurricane activity anywhere in the Atlantic basin was extreme South Florida ͑ϳ15% annual chance͒, many locations throughout Latin America and the Caribbean had at least a 10% annual chance of experiencing a hurricane. These include: the Lesser Antilles from Martinique northward through the British and U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, southern Haiti, Dominican Republic, the northern and central Bahamas, western Cuba, and the Cayman Islands. Locations with a moderate hurricane risk ͑5-10% annual chance͒ are the Lesser Antilles from Grenada to St. Lucia ͑including Barbados͒, northern Haiti, eastern and central Cuba, Jamaica, the southern Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, Honduras, Belize, the Yucatan, and the western Gulf of Mexico coast of Mexico. Locations with a smaller risk of hurricane impacts ͑1-5% annual chance͒ are Trinidad and Tobago, northern Venezuela, northern Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the Bay of Campeche coast of Mexico. Clearly the hurricane risk varies tremendously ͑e.g., by a factor of 12 from Trinidad to the British Virgin Islands͒ throughout the region, but no coastal community north of 10°N is immune to the effects of hurricanes.
The hurricane tracks represented by Fig. 1 help illustrate how these empirical probabilities for Caribbean hurricanes can vary dramatically from one decade to another. These figures highlight the differences between the active 1940s to 1960s versus the quiet 1970s and 1980s. In general for the whole region, accurate records extend back to the mid-1940s, when aircraft reconnaissance provided reliable measures of intensity and position ͑Neu-mann et al. 1999͒. Fig. 2 presents the yearly counts of hurricane strikes ͓from the National Hurricane Center's ''best track'' file; Jarvinen et al. ͑1984͔͒ in subportions of the basin. Central American hurricanes ͓those striking Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; Fig. 2͑a͔͒ show rather pronounced year-to-year variability from a peak of two hurricanes in 1961 and 1974 to none occurring in several years, but rather small decadal changes. The long-term average is 0.2 hurricane strikes per year. Extreme hurricane events occurred in 1955 ͑Janet͒, 1961 ͑Hattie͒, 1974 ͑Fifi͒, and 1998 ͑Mitch͒.
The Northern Caribbean ͓Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Turks and Caicos and U.S. Virgin Islands; Fig. 2͑b͔͒ hurricanes, in contrast, show high interannual variability as well as large multidecadal changes. Hurricane activity was relatively high from the 1940s to the late 1960s and in the late 1990s, while the period from the early 1970s until the mid-1990s was by contrast relatively quiet. Of the five large-impact hurricane events for this region, four ͓Charlie ͑1951͒, Fox ͑1952͒, Flora ͑1963͒, and Inez ͑1966͔͒ were in the earlier active period, while only one ͓David ͑1979͔͒ occurred during the quieter decades. The longterm average for the Northern Caribbean is 1.0 hurricane strikes per year.
The Southern Caribbean ͓Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Montserrat, Nether- Fig. 2͑c͔͒ experiences hurricanes at a lower rate than the Northern Caribbean with only 0.4 hurricane strikes per year. Though the region has the lowest total frequency of events in the Caribbean, it also shows pronounced variability as observed in the Northern Caribbean: active in the 1950s to mid-1960s, relatively quiet from the late 1960s through the mid-1990s, with only two interruptions in 1978 -79 and 1988 -89, and then active from 1995-1999 . This region has been hit by three large-impact hurricane events since the mid-1940s: Janet ͑1955͒, Inez ͑1966͒, and David ͑1979͒.
On an interannual timescale, La Niña events, low vertical windshear, the west phase of the stratospheric quasibiennial oscillation, low sea-level pressures, and warm tropical North Atlantic/Caribbean sea surface temperatures ͑SSTs͒ favor enhanced activity throughout Latin America and the Caribbean ͑Gray 1984; Gray et al. 1994; 1997; Goldenberg and Shapiro 1996; Knaff 1997; Saunders and Harris 1997; Landsea et al. 1999͒ . In contrast, Caribbean hurricanes were reduced during seasons with an El Niño event, high vertical windshear, east stratospheric quasibiennial oscillation, high sea-level pressures, and cool SSTs. Decadal variation is predominantly observed in the Northern and Southern Caribbean, and much less so in Central America ͓Figs. 2͑a-c͔͒.
In recent years, the documented variability of hurricanes in the region suggests the beginnings of a more active regime. Goldenberg et al. ͑2001͒ provide evidence from Atlantic Ocean sea surface temperatures, atmospheric circulation patterns, and the time series of Atlantic hurricanes themselves that 1995 marked a distinct switch back to active conditions last seen in the 1940s to 1960s. If conditions persist as they did last century, high levels of hurricane activity may prevail for the next two to three decades. Such a change would be most evident in the Northern Caribbean ͑1.3 hurricanes per year in the active era versus only 0.4 hurricanes per year that occurred in the quiet era of 1971-1994͒ and the Southern Caribbean ͑0.4 versus 0.2 hurricanes per year͒, but would not cause a significant change in Central American hurricanes ͑0.2 hurricanes per year in both regimes͒.
Normalized Losses and Economic Loss Potentials
As the previous section indicates, in the early years of the twentyfirst century, Central America and the Caribbean may be in a more active hurricane period similar to that of the 1940s through 1960s. If so, this would undoubtedly result in increased potential for economic and human losses in the region, with Hurricane Mitch as a possible harbinger of things to come. But would a change in climate tell the whole story? This section explains the importance of societal factors for understanding increases in hurricane-related damage and loss of life.
Data and Methodology
Consider the case of hurricane losses in the United States as an introduction to the concept of normalized losses ͑NL͒. Extensive research has been conducted on normalized hurricane and flood losses in the United States ͑e.g., Pielke and Landsea 1998; Pielke and Downton 2000; Brooks and Doswell 2001͒ . The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Hurricane Center has kept records of total continental U.S. damage related to hurricanes since 1900 ͑Hebert et al. 1997͒. The raw data are inappropriate for trend analysis, because large societal changes have resulted in dramatic growth in recorded losses, even as hurricane landfalls decreased during the later decades of the twentieth century ͑Land-sea 1993; Pielke and Landsea 1998͒. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a climate signal in the damage data by normalizing the dataset to present-day values by accounting for the most significant societal changes ͑Pielke et al. 1999; A normalized loss dataset is based on three factors: inflation, wealth, and population. These factors are used for several reasons ͓see Pielke and Landsea ͑1998͒ for discussion͔. First, accounting for inflation/deflation is necessary because the value of a currency changes over time. Second, increases in wealth and population mean more people and more property located in exposed areas, so that, consequently, more can be lost. Data on all three factors for the United States are kept by the U.S. government and allow for the creation of a normalized loss dataset for 1925-2001 ͓and alternatively back to 1900 with simplifying assumptions, after Fig. 3͑a͒ shows growth in inflation-adjusted losses from hurricanes in the United States from 1900-2001. This figure shows more damaging events as the twentieth century progressed. When these losses are normalized by adjusting for increases in population, wealth, and inflation, as shown in Fig. 3͑b͒ , it is readily apparent that more frequent events with greater associated losses would have occurred earlier in the century had the societal context of today existed at that time. One implication of this work, largely unrecognized in discussion of climate policy, is that societal factors dominate trends and projections related to the impacts of extreme climate events ͑cf. .
Pielke and Landsea ͑1999͒ provide support for the validity of the assumption that hurricane losses increase in proportion to increases in population, wealth, and inflation by comparing the normalized record of hurricane losses with climatological data on the El Niño/Southern Oscillation ͑ENSO͒, which has a wellestablished relationship to hurricane activity in the Atlantic ͑Landsea 2000a, b͒. During El Niño years, hurricane activity tends to be suppressed in the Atlantic, while during La Niña years it is enhanced. When normalized hurricane damage in the various phases of the ENSO cycle very closely resembles overall variations in hurricane activity within the ENSO cycle documented from climatological data ͑Bove et al. 1998; Pielke and Landsea 1999͒. In addition, Pielke et al. ͑1999͒ provide data showing that a normalized damage record compares favorably with the output of catastrophe models the insurance industry uses to estimate damage. These findings lend support to the notion that a normalization methodology can account in large part for the societal changes that underlie trend data on hurricane impacts, creating a data series that more accurately identifies the unique effects of climate variability and thereby presents a more realistic view of trends in past damage.
Economic data on hurricane damage in Central America and the Caribbean are even more limited than in the United States. Data since 1950 suggest that hurricanes in recent decades have caused greater economic losses than those of past decades ͓cf. Rodriguez ͑1997͒ and the data used in the Cuban case study presented later in this paper͔. The more complete U.S. record ͑non-normalized͒ shows a similar trend of increasingly damaging hurricanes. While intense Atlantic hurricanes were more common between the 1940s and 1960s, they were in comparison much reduced in the 1970s through the early 1990s ͑Landsea et al. 1999͒. Thus, it is logical to hypothesize that increasing societal vulnerability, rather than more frequent or intense hurricanes, is the primary cause of increasing hurricane-related losses in Central America and the Caribbean, as has been shown to be the case in the United States. Fig. 4 shows population growth in selected Central American countries, Northern Caribbean islands, and Southern Caribbean islands. Mexico is not included in this study, even though it has considerable historical losses and vulnerability to hurricanes. Mexico's geographic extent would require a detailed examination of historical economic and demographic data that goes well beyond the scope of this study. Thus, an exploration of trends in hurricane vulnerability in Mexico awaits further study.
To facilitate comparison of population growth among these countries, the graphs set the 1900 population at 1, with population for successive periods shown as a multiple of the 1900 population. For example, Costa Rica's 1998 population was approximately 12 times larger than its 1900 population ͓Fig. 4͑a͔͒ and the Dominican Republic's 1998 population was almost 14 times as great as its 1900 population ͓Fig. 4͑b͔͒.
Figs. 5 and 6 show changes in wealth, as measured by gross domestic product ͑GDP͒ and per capita GDP, in selected Central American and Caribbean countries. ͓On GDP as a measure of wealth, see World Bank ͑1993͒ and Moulton et al. ͑1999͒; on its limitations, see Cobb et al. ͑1995͒ .͔ In the analysis described as follows, because of the limitations of available data, GDP is used instead of direct measurements of aggregate national wealth under an assumption that changes in GDP will be highly correlated with measures of changes in national wealth; per capita GDP factors out the effects of population growth. For example, Fig. 5͑a͒ shows that, from 1960 to 1998, national GDP in Costa Rica increased by a factor of about 5. Fig. 6͑a͒ shows that the average per person GDP in Costa Rica increased by only about 1.5 times during the same period. The difference is accounted for by the overall growth in Costa Rica's population. For purposes of normalizing hurricane damage, more precise explanations for growth ͑or declines͒ in vulnerability are possible by differentiating between growth in population and growth in wealth. Thus, where data are available, we seek to separate out population growth from overall GDP growth.
Data on growth in population, wealth, and inflation allow for normalization of hurricane damage from any given year to estimate roughly what the economic losses would have been if the storm occurred in a different year under different societal conditions. The general approach for normalizing losses from a single storm that impacts several countries is as follows:
where xϭyear in which losses are to be estimated; yϭyear of storm's actual impact; cϭcountry of storm's impact; NL x ϭstorm loss normalized to year x; L y,c ϭstorm's actual losses in country c, in current-year dollars ͑not adjusted for inflation͒; I y,c ϭinflation factor, determined by the ratio of the implicit price deflator for country c in year x to that of year y; W y,c ϭwealth , 1906, 1916, 1926, 1936, 1946, 1956, 1976, 1988, 1990, 1998͒ ; Anuario Estadistico de Cuba ͑1987, 1997͒; Cuba en Cifras factor, determined for country c by the ratio of its inflationadjusted, per capita Gross Domestic Product in year x to that of year y; and P y,c ϭpopulation factor, determined for country c by the ratio of its population in year x to that of year y.
Inflation in the United States is accounted for using the implicit price deflator for the Gross National Product, as derived from the Handbook of Labor Statistics ͑U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1971͒, the Economic Report of the President ͑Office of the President 1960, 1997͒, and the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis website ͑BEA 1999͒. For the United States, Pielke and Landsea ͑1998͒ use a measure of national wealth more accurate than GDP, called Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth. This measure was adjusted to a per capita basis based on the population of the coastal counties affected. This allowed for a normalization that more precisely and more accurately reflects the changes occurring in the regions most affected by hurricanes. The size of the countries in Central America and the Caribbean that are the focus of this paper makes such a calculation less necessary, while data availability makes it unrealistic. It would, of course, be possible to develop other normalization methods that use other factors that might be related to growth in impacts.
Using this methodology, Table 2 shows losses normalized to 1998 for selected Central American and Caribbean hurricanes since 1960. As this table illustrates, each of these storms would cause considerably more damage if they occurred in 1998 rather than in the year in which they occurred.
Until data become readily available for all storms and all countries, it will not be possible to present a complete trend of normalized hurricane losses in Central America and the Caribbean. The next two sections present ͑1͒ a complete normalization analysis for Cuba; and ͑2͒ for a number of other countries, an analysis of trends in Economic Loss Potential that can be used as a foundation to normalize loss data, should they become more readily available.
Normalized Losses in Cuba: 1900-1998
We single out Cuba for detailed analysis because of the availability of a new dataset on historical hurricane losses in Cuba created by the second author and published here for the first time. This dataset allows for a complete normalization of the Cuban hurricane loss record. Fig. 7 shows the number of landfalling hurricanes in Cuba from 1900 to 1998 ͑Rubiera, from Coleccion de Publicaciones Cubanas, Biblioteca Instituto de Meteorologia, La Habana, Cuba͒. Table 3 and Fig. 8 show the economic losses associated with these storms, in millions of current-year and inflation-adjusted U.S. dollars. United States inflation rates are used because the original hurricane loss figures are expressed in current U.S. dollars. Even with relatively few events, the time series shows that more recent storms have tended to cause greater damage than those of the more distant past, just as has been the case in the United States.
To adjust for changes in the Cuban economy since 1903, we use three sets of data. The various datasets are necessary because of disagreement among economists about how to represent trends in inflation and wealth in the Cuban economy. While these disagreements may well have important implications for other areas of analysis, conclusions based on normalized hurricane losses are insensitive to the dataset chosen. Thus, the following analysis uses a range of datasets ͑see Table 4 for data sources and comments͒. The United Nations ͑UN͒ data are in both current-year pesos and equivalent U.S. dollars, assuming an official exchange rate of one Cuban peso to one U.S. dollar. The 1960 The -1997 Cuban data are in current-year pesos.
To illustrate the normalization methodology, consider Hurricane Flora ͑1963͒ as an example. Flora resulted in an estimated current-year damage of U.S. $300 million in Cuba. The first normalization method relies on the change in Cuban wealth from 1963 to 1997, based on a combination of the Mitchell and UN data sets. We normalize to 1997 values because 1997 is the latest year for which Cuban wealth data are available.
The Cuban GDP in 1963 was 3,450 million pesos, in 1970 it was 5,420 pesos, and by 1997 it was 23,200 million pesos. Because the first normalization method combines two different GDP datasets ͑Mitchell from 1903 to 1969; UN from 1970 to 1997͒, we multiplied $300 million by the ratio of 1970 GDP, the first year of the UN dataset, to 1963 GDP, the year of Hurricane Flora, times the ratio of 1997 GDP, the last year of the UN dataset, to 1970 GDP, the first year of the UN dataset: Because of uncertainty in the wealth adjustment, damage also can be normalized using a fourth method that relies only on changes in inflation and population. U.S. inflation rates are used because the original hurricane loss figures are expressed in current U.S. dollars. This method is useful for calibrating the other normalization methods. The normalized losses ͑NL͒ that would be attributed to Hurricane Flora if it had struck Cuba in 1997 are computed as follows:
Cuba's population increased by a factor of 1.48, from 7,512,000 in 1963 to 11,093,000 in 1997. In 1963 a dollar in the United States was worth about 4.61 times its value in 1997. Normalizing Flora's damage to 1997 values using this approach results in slightly over $2 billion in losses ($300 million•1.477
•4.61ϭ$2,043 million). This result is somewhat higher than several of the results produced using the second and third normalization methods based on increases in wealth. This could illustrate that wealth and population in the Caribbean and Central America Belize $600,000 $11 million a Due to a lack of per capita GDP for Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, St. Martin, St. Maartin, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Belize, we used the average of known per capita GDP for the relevant region. We also used an average of the Southern Caribbean population to measure population growth in normalizing Hurricane Luis damages. b Our information does not disclose in which of the remaining countries $1 billion of these losses were incurred, so we have normalized these damages using average Central America values. Fig. 7 . Number of hurricanes that made landfall in Cuba, do not always move in the same direction, as has been the case in the United States. For example, if a country has a population of 10 with a per capita GDP of $1, its overall wealth is $10. If its population grows to 20 but its per capita GDP falls to $.75, the population is larger and the country is richer with an overall GDP of $15, but its inhabitants are poorer. It also could reflect the inadequacies of the wealth data. Fig. 9 shows the range of estimates of Cuban hurricane damage in normalized 1997 U.S. dollars using these methods. Although the values for individual storms are somewhat different for each of the methods, the overall pattern is quite similar and thus relatively insensitive to the choice of wealth dataset. Regardless of the method used, all methods show that most normalized hurricane losses in Cuba occurred between the mid-1920s and , 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980͔͒ e ''Flora'' was famous for the loops it made, staying up to 72 hours over Cuba's eastern region. It was a weakening storm over the mountains, but it had torrential rains with much flooding. Greatest amounts of rain were over 1,600 mm, with some points over 2,000 mm. mid-1960s. Any trend of increasingly damaging storms has disappeared, consistent with the incidence of landfalling hurricanes shown in Fig. 7 . The findings are consistent with the results of Pielke and Landsea ͑1998͒ for the United States. In November 2001, following the completion of this case study, Hurricane Michelle struck Cuba. As a Category 4 hurricane, Michelle is the strongest hurricane to strike the island since 1952. Michelle caused about $2.0 billion in agricultural and property damage, which places it as the most destructive hurricane in Cuba's history based on actual damage. However, Michelle's destruction is quite similar to that which would have been caused by the more violent hurricanes of the past if they struck Cuba today.
Economic Loss Potential
A complete record of economic losses associated with hurricanes is not readily available for other Caribbean and Central American countries. Consequently, it is not possible to produce a complete record of normalized hurricane losses for these countries in the same manner presented herein for Cuba. One way around this data limitation is to calculate economic loss potential ͑ELP͒. ELP is a comparison of changes in the potential for hurricane losses, again based on the assumption that increases in wealth, population, and inflation will increase hurricane losses. The growth in ELP since 1960 ͑when the available data record begins͒ to the present can be computed by multiplying the change in per capita wealth since 1960, measured in constant U.S. dollars, by the change in population, by an inflation multiplier.
For example, economic loss potential for the Dominican Republic for 1980 is calculated as follows:
The change in wealth equals 1980 per capita income divided by 1960 per capita income, or 865/475ϭ1.82. The inflation factor equals the 1980 U.S. implicit price deflator divided by the 1960 implicit price deflator, or 0.56134/0.21654ϭ2.59. Finally, the change in population equals the 1980 population divided by the 1960 population, or 5,499,000/3,047,000ϭ1.8. The product of these figures can be used to estimate that a hurricane that occurred in 1980 in the Dominican Republic would cause approximately 8.5 times the damage it would have caused had it occurred in 1960. Fig. 10 shows the ELP for selected Caribbean and Central American countries between 1960 and 1990. ͑Economic loss potential is interpolated for years that data were not available.͒ Fig.  11 shows the ELP for Cuba using the four normalization methods, with 1903 as the base year. We compute Cuban ELP beginning in 1903 because that is the earliest year for which we have wealth data. Should historical trend data on economic losses become available, the calculation of a normalized loss record using the ELP is straightforward. Fig. 12 compares the growth in economic loss potential for the United States ͑using national figures͒ and Cuba ͑using the four normalization methods͒ beginning with 1925, the earliest year of our U.S. wealth data set. The U.S. growth in economic loss potential began exceeding that of Cuba around 1958. 1929, 1931, 1932, 1934, 1935, 1937, 1959, 1960, and 1961 . These values have been interpolated. The Mitchell data set reported both NNP and GDP for 1950; we used the GDP figure for that year, which was somewhat higher than the NNP figure. 1970-1997 United Nations Statistical Division ͑personal correspondence, 1999͒ 1960-1997 1960-1975 
Loss of Life
To shape expectations about the possible exceptional nature of the human losses associated with Hurricane Mitch, a normalization methodology also can be used, in principle, to estimate the loss of life related to a hurricane had the storm occurred in a different year, based on the simple assumption that hurricane deaths increase in proportion to population. This assumption would be less relevant in countries such as the United States and Cuba that have seen dramatic improvements in preparedness, technology, and infrastructure. However, for many Caribbean and Latin American countries, such improvements have yet to occur ͑Degg 1992; IF-RCRCS 1999͒.
A simple normalization of loss of life is computed by multiplying the number of deaths caused by the hurricane in the year that the hurricane struck ͑year x͒ by the change in population from the year of the hurricane to year y ͑year y population/year x population͒. Table 5 compares actual death tolls from several 20th century Central American and Caribbean hurricanes to normalized estimates of the number of deaths that these hurricanes would have caused had they struck in 1998. This table makes all too clear a startling point: If storms of comparable intensity to those that hit the Caribbean and Central America many years ago struck today, death tolls could be comparable to, and in some cases could exceed, those associated with Hurricane Mitch. Hurricane Mitch was by no means unique.
These figures might even be conservative. As populations rapidly grow, the proportion of people living in disaster-prone areas such as flash-flood zones, mudslide-prone valleys, and storm surge-threatened lowlands goes up even faster ͑Degg 1992͒. The point of this simple exercise is to complement more rigorous approaches to understanding mortality. The simple exercise suggests that Hurricane Mitch was likely not a unique or even a rare event.
Discussion
The data and analysis in this paper suggest that the impacts of Hurricane Mitch were not anomalous when compared with a nor- ' ͑OCHA et al. 1999͒ . Some of the interrelated humancaused factors that increase vulnerability to natural disasters such as Mitch include rapidly increasing populations, widespread poverty, lack of access to adequate land, deforestation, and urbanization. Hurricane Mitch should thus direct our attention to the broader dimensions of hurricane vulnerability in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Central America's population is growing rapidly, with average annual growth rates over the past ten years ranging from 1.6% in Panama to 2.6% in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua ͑data provided by Inter-American Development Bank͒. Population growth increases vulnerability because there are more people for a disaster to impact and because more people settle in exposed areas. ͓Fig. 4͑a͒ shows population growth in selected Central American countries.͔ In addition, population growth is related to poverty. In some countries an inverse relationship has been demonstrated between per capita GNP and total fertility rates, with countries having some of the highest fertility rates among the poorest ͑World Bank 1993͒. Poverty is a critical factor underlying vulnerability ͑Lavell 1994; Peacock et al. 1997; Pulwarty and Riebsame 1997; Morrow 2000͒. Poverty is endemic in the region affected by Mitch. For example, 48% of El Salvador's population was living in poverty in 1994, poverty being defined as having ''a monthly income level insufficient to purchase two basic food baskets'' ͑World Bank 1999a͒; approximately 75% of Guatemala's population was living below the poverty line in 1995, thus defined as the amount needed to purchase a basic basket of goods and services ͑World Bank 1999b͒; and half of Nicaragua's population fell below the poverty line in 1995, defined as the level of total per capita monthly expenditures at which one obtains the minimum daily caloric requirement of 2,226 calories per adult ͑World Bank 1999c͒. The percentages of Central Americans living below the international poverty line, defined as making less than $1 per day at 1985 international prices, adjusted for purchasing power parity, were: Guatemala ͑1989͒, 53%; Honduras ͑1992͒, 47%; Panama ͑1989͒, 27%; and Costa Rica ͑1989͒, 19% ͑World Bank 1999d͒.
Poverty can increase natural disaster vulnerability in at least three ways. First, impoverished people often lack access to land that is relatively unexposed to disasters. When Hurricane Fifi hit Honduras in 1974, land ownership had become highly concentrated, with 63% of Honduran farmers having access to only 6% of arable land. This was due to a variety of factors: large landowners driving out small farmers from their land to create large cotton estates, growth in land-intensive livestock production, ownership of large tracts of land by banana companies, and use of valley floors for large-scale irrigation projects ͑Painter and Durham 1995; Pulwarty and Riebsame 1997͒. Peasants were forced onto steep hillsides where agricultural practices increased soil erosion and siltation of rivers. Fifi killed as many as 10,000 Hondurans. In one town alone, 2,300 were killed when a dam created by landslides into a river gave way ͑Pulwarty and Riebsame 1997͒. Yet after Fifi, trends continued, setting the stage for Mitch; the Honduran Central Bank estimated that, by 1988, 48% of valley lands in the country were sown in pasture for cattle ͑DeWalt 1999͒.
Second, poor people migrate to urban areas in search of economically gainful activity if they are displaced from the land for whatever reason. Lacking access to safe building sites, they choose the remaining alternatives, which are frequently on steep hillsides or in flood-prone areas ͑Vermeiren 1989; Lavell 1994͒. Development of urban slopes and hilltops increases the risk of flooding lower-lying areas, where many Central American urban poor reside ͑Lavell 1994͒. Between 1980 and 1997 the percentages of Central Americans living in urban areas increased by anywhere from 3% in Guatemala to 10% in Nicaragua and Honduras ͑World Bank 1999d͒. The following percentages of Central Americans lived in urban areas in 1997: Costa Rica, 50%; El Salvador, 46%; Guatemala, 40%; Honduras, 45%; Nicaragua, 63%; and Panama, 56% ͑World Bank 1999d͒.
Finally, although deforestation is caused by many factors, such as conversion of forests to grazing and farming uses, road building and settlement, mining, and logging ͑Thrupp 1993͒, poverty can also force the clearing of forests for agriculture, homebuilding, and fuel gathering. Deforestation adds to vulnerability by increasing soil erosion, which can enhance the incidence of landslides, mudslides, and flooding. Average annual deforestation rates for Central America from 1990 to 1995-Costa Rica, 3%; El Salvador, 3.3%; Guatemala, 2%; Honduras, 2.3%; and Panama, 2.1%-were some of the highest in the world ͑World Bank 1999d͒. Many of the factors that have increased vulnerability in Central America also exist in the Caribbean. While the rates of population growth are generally not as high as in Central America, countries such as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and the Bahamas experienced average annual growth rates of 1.6 and 1.7% in the last decade ͑data provided by Inter-America Development Bank͒. ͓Figs. 4͑b and c͒ show population growth in selected Caribbean countries.͔ The incidence of poverty in the Caribbean varies widely. In 1989, 48% of Dominican Republicans lived on less than $2 per day; in 1993, 25% of Jamaicans lived at this level ͑World Bank 1999d͒.
As in Central America, land is inequitably distributed in parts of the Caribbean. For example, 82% of Dominican Republic farmers have access to 12% of the agricultural land; 59% of farmers in Haiti occupy 22% of land, a pattern seen in Jamaica as well ͑World Bank 1993͒. Much of the land occupied by small farmers is either in mountainous areas or on hillsides ͑World Bank 1993͒. Some of the most substantial Caribbean losses from hurricanes in the last 50 years-Flora, 1963 ͑approximately 8,000 deaths͒, and Gordon, 1994 ͑1,145 deaths͒-occurred because of floods, mudslides, and landslides on hilly terrain ͑Rappaport and FernandezPartagas 1997͒.
Deforestation is also occurring at a rapid rate in parts of the Caribbean. Between 1990 and 1995, Jamaica had an average annual deforestation rate of 7.2%; Haiti's was 3.4% ͑World Bank 1999d͒. Between 1978 and 1988, Haiti's forested land decreased at a rate ''bordering on desertification'' ͑World Bank 1993͒. Jamaica suffered unprecedented landslides from Hurricane Gilbert in 1988 due, in part, to the extensive removal of tree cover from steep slopes by several large-scale coffee projects ͑Pulwarty and Riebsame 1997͒. And urbanization is rapidly increasing in many Caribbean countries due to high fertility rates, restrictions on migration, and internal migration of the rural poor ͑Berke and Beatley 1997͒. Between 1970 and 1995, the percentages of the population living in urban areas increased by as much as 33% in Trinidad/Tobago and Saint Vincent/the Grenadines ͑ECLAC 1997͒. By 2000, over 64% of the Caribbean basin population is expected to be living in urban areas, up from 38% in 1960 ͑Berke and Beatley 1997͒.
Conclusion
The introduction asked: What accounts for the extent of the losses experienced in Hurricane Mitch? Is Mitch a harbinger of future disasters? What might be done in response? The analysis presented in this paper shows dramatically that the impacts of Hurricane Mitch were the result of a powerful storm that encountered profound human vulnerability. The data and analysis presented in this paper suggest that Hurricane Mitch is indeed a harbinger of future disasters unless actions are taken to reduce societal vulnerability. Such actions will be most effective if focused on processes of sustainable development.
In the area of sustainable development, the issues of poverty, land use, and environmental stewardship are certainly not new. But to some degree, in the context of hurricane impacts in particular, these issues arguably have been overshadowed by concern about global climate change ͑Pielke et al. 2000͒ . Some have asserted that deadly and damaging storms like Mitch are a result of ''global warming.'' For example, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies ͑IFRCRCS͒ reported that the intense level of North Atlantic hurricane activity between 1995 and 1998 that culminated in Mitch ''appear͓s͔ to be linked to ''global warming'' ͑IFRCRCS 1999͒. J. Bryan Atwood, former director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, cited Mitch as an example of a ''classic greenhouse effect'' ͑Atwood 1998͒. Others extrapolate that more frequent or intense tropical cyclones will be a byproduct of global climate change ͑e.g., Berke and Beatley 1997; Sachs 1999͒. These attributions, and others like them, are more than marketing devices in an increasingly polarized debate about energy policies. They are also the ideas that underlie policy recommendations for how society should allocate and use its finite resources to address the issue of future hurricane impacts. Some have suggested that Hurricane Mitch and possible future storms mean that society must redouble its efforts to reduce emissions in order to modulate future hurricane frequencies or intensities ͑e.g., Sachs 1999͒. Others have suggested that reducing societal vulnerability to hurricane impacts deserves greater attention ͑Pulwarty and Riebsame 1997͒.
The data presented in this paper support directing greater attention to reducing vulnerability, in accordance with Landsea et al. ͑1999͒: ''There is no evidence that society can intentionally modulate tropical cyclone frequencies and magnitudes through energy policies... . If a policy objective is to reduce society's vulnerability to hurricane impacts, then decision makers would be wiser to consider better adapting to documented variability, rather than preventing storms from occurring.'' Because tremendous population growth occurred during the last inactive period from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s, the countries of the Caribbean will likely experience large hurricane impacts in the next couple of decades, regardless of future storm incidence.
It is perhaps seductive to think that there exists a ''silver bullet'' solution to reducing the future impacts of hurricanes in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ample evidence suggests this is but wishful thinking. Scholars and practitioners have historically faced tremendous difficulties in addressing factors conditioning hurricane losses, particularly in developing countries. Attention diverted in hopes of a ''silver bullet'' solution only creates delay and distraction from the political, institutional, and intellectual steps that need to be taken. One prediction can be made with confidence, however. If present trends continue, events like Mitch will become more common, irrespective of the future climate.
